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I. INTRODUCTION
In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. ("ARCO"), the
Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals,2 held that an antitrust plaintiff suffers no "antitrust
injury" "when it loses sales to a competitor charging nonpredatory
prices pursuant to a vertical maximum price-fixing scheme."' 3 The
ARCO case involved, directly and indirectly, two of the most con-
troversial issues in modem antitrust law: (1) the extent to which
antitrust injury is a prerequisite to recovery under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act; and (2) whether vertical maximum price fixing ought
* Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
B.S. 1971, J.D. 1975, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
2. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
3. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1887.
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to be illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.4
The Court in ARCO directly addressed the first issue. Section 4
of the Clayton Act states that private actions for treble damages
may be maintained by "any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws."5 Such actions are limited, however, by the "antitrust in-
jury" requirement originally announced by the Court in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 6 As established by Brunswick,
plaintiffs proceeding under Section 4 "must prove more than injury
causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful." 7
In ARCO,' USA Petroleum, an independent marketer of gaso-
line, sued ARCO, an integrated oil company, and its dealers alleg-
ing that they had engaged in a maximum price fixing or limit
pricing conspiracy, which fixed gasoline prices at levels that,
though not "predatory," 9 were below USA Petroleum's cost "with
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, is the foundation of American
antitrust law and provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
5. Id. § 15. Under § l(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1988), the "antitrust
laws" include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1988); and the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1988).
6. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
7. Id. at 489. The Court extended the antitrust injury requirement to private actions
for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, in Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986).
8. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
9. Predatory pricing occurs when a firm, in an effort to maintain or acquire a monop-
oly, undersells its rivals by pricing below cost. After rivals are driven out of business, the
predator raises its prices to monopoly levels to offset the losses incurred during the preda-
tory pricing campaign. Since 1975, when the cost-based Areeda-Turner test was intro-
duced, Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975), few plaintiffs have
prevailed on predatory pricing theories, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAW 172 (1985) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS]. As in other
areas of antitrust, declined enforcement and limited plaintiff recovery is due to increasing
judicial acceptance of neoclassical economic views; here, that predatory pricing is irra-
tional and rarely occurs. See HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra; ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 144-55 (1978) [hereinafter BORK, PARADOX]; Frank H. Easter-brook. Predatory..€trntaoioav n.A . . U. ,-ii. L. Rjv. 263 AiOIT). Th e
Supreme Court has not defined predatory pricing but has hinted that it might involve "(i)
pricing below the level necessary to sell [the defendant's] products, or (ii) pricing below
some appropriate measure of cost." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
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the purpose and effect of making it impossible for plaintiff and
other independents to compete."'" In essence, USA Petroleum al-
leged that ARCO and its co-conspirators sold gasoline at retail for
less than independents like USA Petroleum could purchase it at
wholesale." USA Petroleum further alleged that the conspiracy
resulted in a "steady and continuous reduction in the competitive
effectiveness of independent refiners and marketers selling in Cali-
fornia and the western United States,"' 2 and that, as a result,
"more than a dozen large independents have sold out, liquidated or
drastically curtailed their operations, and many independent retail
stations have closed."1 3 Despite these consequences, which were
assumed to be true because the case was decided on a motion for
summary judgment, the Court denied USA Petroleum standing to
maintain its Section 4 action.' 4 The Court observed that although
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes a vertical maximum price-
fixing agreement unlawful, "it does not cause a competitor anti-
trust injury unless it results in predatory pricing."15
The second issue raised by the ARCO case, although not directly
addressed by the Court, is the heart of the dispute and the focus of
this Article. The second issue was simply whether the substantive
rule allegedly involved in ARCO-that vertical agreements to fix
maximum resale prices are per se illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act-is correct. As explained below, the ARCO case,
though not resolving this issue, embodies the continuing dispute
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits regarding the wisdom of
the Supreme Court's vertical maximum price-fixing rule.
The rule that vertical maximum price fixing is per se illegal was
first announced by the Court in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. ,6 and reinforced in Albrecht v. Herald Co. 7
The Albrecht rule has been harshly criticized by members of the
"Chicago School" of antitrust ideology,' 8 whose views have had a
475 U.S. 574, 584-85 n.8 (1986). For a discussion of various judicial approaches to pred-
atory pricing, see Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Tur-
ner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1052 (1986).
10. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1896 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 31 of plaintiff's
amended complaint).
11. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 1896-97 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 of plaintiff's amended
complaint).
13. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 of plaintiff's amended complaint).
14. Id. at 1887.
15. Id. at 1887-88.
16. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
17. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
18. For the views of the the Chicago School, see BORK, PARADOX, supra note 9, and
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profound impact on the development of modem antitrust law, par-
ticularly vertical restraints of trade. 9 Because prominent members
of the Chicago School, namely Judges Posner and Easterbrook, are
now members of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, it is not
surprising that, unable directly to overrule Albrecht, the Seventh
Circuit has given its rule of per se illegality for maximum price
fixing a very narrow reading. The Seventh Circuit has done this by
constricting the antitrust injury requirement.
For example, in 1984, Judge Posner authored the opinion in
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc. 20 In this case,
Walters, a dealer in Morton's prefabricated buildings, alleged that
Morton had limited the prices that dealers could charge customers,
specifically by acting to assure that dealers honored Morton's peri-
odically advertised sale prices.2 1 Judge Posner noted that even if
illegal maximum price fixing had occurred,22 the plaintiff suffered
no antitrust injury.23 Judge Posner reasoned that Walters's loss
resulted in a gain to consumers because competing dealers, or even
Morton, would lower their price to consumers if Walters did not.24
Judge Posner concluded that the plaintiff "will not be heard to
complain about having to meet lawful price competition, which an-
titrust law seeks to encourage, merely because the competition
might have been enabled by an antitrust violation."25
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's formulation, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found both standing and antitrust injury in ARCO by follow-
ing the more traditional reasoning that a competitor should have
standing to vindicate conduct that the Court has consistently de-
clared to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.26 Expressly
repudiating Judge Posner's reasoning in Jack Walters, the Ninth
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979). A brief summary of the Chicago School theory appears in Wesley A. Cann, Jr.,
Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency" Influence-Does Any Room Remain for More
Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative Antitrust Policies?, 24 AM. Bus. L.J.
483, 486-93 (1987).
19. For an extended criticism of the current law of vertical restraints, see Mark E.
Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and Its "Rule of Reason": The Dealer
Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REV.
129 (1989).
20. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
21. Id. at 706.
22. Id. at 708-09.
23. Id. at 709.
24. Id.
25. Id. For further discussion of this case, see infra note 135.
26. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687, 696 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
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Circuit noted that the antitrust laws were meant to give competi-
tors an "even playing field,"27 and reasoned that the competitive
process works only if market participants are not allowed to com-
bine to fix prices in advance. 2 The court concluded that the anti-
trust policy is best effectuated by according competitors "standing"
to enforce antitrust laws prohibiting price-fixing, 29 and that "the
injury done to the market and to competitors by price-fixing con-
spiracies is antitrust-injury-the type of injury the antitrust laws
were meant to prevent." '30
Commenting on the character of the dispute between the cir-
cuits, Professors Blair and Harrison noted that "[t]he division be-
tween the Ninth and Seventh Circuits is probably at least as much
about the Albrecht rule itself as it is about antitrust injury. ' Blair
and Harrison observed that although the Ninth Circuit's approach
appears to show "deference to the Supreme Court's position on
vertical maximum price-fixing," the court's opinion also "reflects a
strong general agreement with the substantive rule. '3 2 The Sev-
enth Circuit's approach, in contrast, evinces "a conviction that the
substantive rule itself is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust
law."' 33 Based on these observations, Professors Blair and Harrison
suggest that the Supreme Court should reconsider Albrecht. 4
They conclude, however, that because "the current battle is waged
27. Id at 697.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Rodger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L.
REv. 1539, 1556 (1989) [hereinafter Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust]. Interest-
ingly, even members of the Chicago School criticize Judge Posner's activist stance in Jack
Walters. For example, Professor Hovenkamp, a self-described Chicago School "fellow
traveler," Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213,
213 n.* (1985), noted:
Even consumers would not be able to bring actions under the rule established
in Judge Posner's opinion in Jack Walters ....
... I cannot escape the conclusion that Judge Posner-growing impatient
with Congress's or the Supreme Court's refusal to overrule Albrecht-has de-
cided to undertake the task on his own.
Members of the Chicago School have visions, as do most of us, of the kinds of
things that should obtain in a perfect world. The per se rule against resale price
maintenance is definitely not among them. That fact justifies arguments, both
theoretical and political. But it does not justify taking the matter into one's
own hands, no matter how certain we may be that we are right.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014, 1025-26 (foot-
note omitted).
32. Blair & Harrison, supra note 31, at 1555-56.
33. Id. at 1556.
34. Id.
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in the 'code' of a very elastic concept of an antitrust injury, it re-
mains to be seen whether we have moved toward a substantive re-
consideration of Albrecht. ' 35
Although paying lip service to the Albrecht rule,36 the Supreme
Court clearly gutted it in ARCO by adopting the Seventh Circuit's
restrictive antitrust injury requirement for vertical maximum
price-fixing cases.3 7 That is, the Court in ARCO avoided a substan-
tive reconsideration of Albrecht but severely restricted it through
the "code" of antitrust injury. The remainder of this Article ad-
dresses the question that the Court ducked in ARCO: Should Al-
brecht be overruled? In other words, as a matter of substantive
antitrust law, should vertical maximum price fixing be per se ille-
gal? Despite reams of caustic criticism of Albrecht, the answer,
developed below, is clear: the Albrecht rule is unequivocally
correct.
II. CASES ESTABLISHING THE PER SE RULE AGAINST
VERTICAL MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING
Commentators have harshly and relentlessly criticized the
Supreme Court's long-standing rule that vertical maximum price
fixing is per se illegal. 38  To determine whether such criticism is
warranted, this Article first examines in detail the cases announc-
ing the per se standard to ascertain both the specific facts underly-
ing the disputes and the reasoning used by the Court. Second, this
Article examines the validity of the voluminous criticism of the
rule.
35. Id
36. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1889 n.5 (1990).
37. Id. at 1890-91.
38. 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1634-1640 (1989); BORK, PARADOX,
supra note 9; HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 265; Rodger D. Blair & James
M. Fesmire, Maximum Pricing Fixing and the Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV.
43 (1986) [hereinafter Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing]; Blair & Harrison, Re-
thinking Antitrust, supra note 31, at 1553; Rodger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The
Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461
(1981) [hereinafter Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule]; Rodger D. Blair & Carolyn
D. Schafer, Evolutionary Models of Legal Change and the Albrecht Rule, 32 ANTITRUST
BULL. 989, 994-1000 (1987) [hereinafter Blair & Schafer, Evolutionary Models]; Frank H.
Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981); Milton Handler,
Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1299-1307 (1982); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the Newspaper Monoolist. 69 Tnwx_ L. Rn.'. 451,
45d ( .OQA'/........ "  Huvenkamp, Vertical Integration]; Richard A. Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 257-58
(1968).
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Despite all the commentary, vertical maximum price fixing cases
are extremely rare. The Supreme Court has decided only three
such cases, involving widely varied fact situations: Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. ;39 Albrecht v. Herald Co.;"
and ARCO.4" For example, Kiefer-Stewart involved an attempt by
suppliers to control downstream liquor prices charged by an al-
leged wholesaler cartel after the Office of Price Administration
("O.P.A.") price controls were lifted.4 2 Albrecht involved a news-
paper publisher's attempt to control price gouging by its distribu-
tors after the publisher had established them in exclusive
territories.43 ARCO involved an alleged attempt by an oil company
to destroy independent retail competition by maintaining its deal-
ers' prices at artificially low levels.' In only two of these cases
could the defendant assert a pro-competitive motive; breaking up a
cartel in Kiefer-Stewart and controlling a reseller's local monopoly
in Albrecht. As developed below, however, these justifications for
vertical maximum price fixing wither when examined in light of
basic antitrust principles and when restrictive newspaper distribu-
tion schemes, such as existed in Albrecht, are examined under rule
of reason analysis.45
A. Kiefer-Stewart
In Kiefer-Stewart,4 6 an Indiana liquor wholesaler sued Seagram
and Calvert Corporations, wholly-owned subsidiaries of a single
parent, alleging that Seagram and Calvert had conspired to sell li-
quor only to wholesalers that observed maximum resale prices set
by the defendants.47 The elimination of O.P.A. regulation of liquor
prices in October 1946 precipitated the conspiracy.48 Under the
O.P.A. scheme, liquor markups were limited to 15% over cost, ex-
clusive of state and federal taxes.4 9 This formula reduced whole-
sale profits to approximately 10% of the selling price." After price
controls were lifted, the plaintiff, Kiefer-Stewart, and other Indi-
39. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
40. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
42. Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 212.
43. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147.
44. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1887-88.
45. See infra part III.
46. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
47. Id. at 229-31.
48. Id. at 230.
49. Id.
50. Id.
1992]
Loyola University Law Journal
ana liquor wholesalers met through their trade association and
shortly thereafter announced identical liquor price increases re-
flecting a 15% markup on overall costs, including taxes.51 Thus,
the liquor wholesalers entered into a horizontal price-fixing con-
spiracy that, although not directly in issue, apparently violated the
Sherman Act. 2
To control this alleged conspiracy, Seagram sent a telegram to
all United States wholesalers announcing its intent privately to
reimpose O.P.A. pricing restrictions noting: "This decision was
reached because of our sincere belief that it is not in our nor the
public's interest to raise whiskey prices. By holding the price line
we can win the fullest measure of public appreciation and confi-
dence in our industry. '5 3 The telegram also urged the wholesalers
to pressure their retailers to keep prices down.54 Seagram then sus-
pended shipments to uncooperative Indiana wholesalers, who, with
the exception of Kiefer-Stewart, quickly capitulated and restored
O.P.A. prices.55 Calvert, who originally had agreed to supply
Kiefer-Stewart despite Seagram's policy, ultimately refused to deal
with Kiefer-Stewart.56
After a jury returned a verdict in favor of Kiefer-Stewart, Sea-
gram and Calvert appealed. 57 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to
establish horizontal conspiracy between Seagram and Calvert,58
and that even if a conspiracy existed, it was not illegal. The court
reasoned that Seagram and Calvert had only set a maximum price,
not a fixed price at which their products must be sold,59 and that
the wholesalers were free to charge any price within the maximum
limit and could charge different prices for Seagram and Calvert
products.' The court concluded that this restriction neither re-
strained trade nor impaired competition, 61 noting that competition
depends on the ability to meet prices or beat the price fixed by a
51. Id. at 214.
52. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 182 F.2d 228, 229-30 (7th
Cir. 1950).
53. Id. at 230.
54. Id. at 230-31.
55. Id. at 231.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 229.
58. Id -t 23..
59. Id. at 235.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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competitor, not upon the ability to charge higher prices.6 2 The
court also noted that the defendants faced a potential "two-homed
dilemma": 63 liability for maximum price fixing by refusing to sell;
or liability for participation in the retailers' horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy by selling to them without restriction and with knowl-
edge of the scheme. 64
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiefer-Stewart and re-
versed the decision of the Seventh Circuit.65 Justice Black suc-
cinctly disposed of the Seventh Circuit's opinion, reasoning that
agreements fixing maximum prices, like those fixing minimum
prices, "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their
ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. ' 66 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the holding of its landmark
case, United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. ,67 that: "Under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate of foreign commerce is illegal per
se.'" 68 Justice Black also rejected the wholesaler-cartel defense by
noting that if the plaintiff and other wholesalers were themselves
guilty of antitrust violations, they could be held responsible in
other governmental or private proceedings.69 Justice Black stated
that Kiefer-Stewart's alleged illegal conduct could not legalize the
defendants' unlawful combination "nor immunize them against lia-
bility to those they injured." 70 In essence, the Court held that two
62. Id.
63. Id. at 234.
64. Id. at 233-34 (citing United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293
(1945)). Judge Bork also noted the alleged benefits in Kiefer-Stewart of maximum price
fixing in breaking down the wholesaler cartel:
If a manufacturer knows, or suspects but cannot prove, that resellers have
cartelized, the manufacturer can provide a powerful incentive for resellers to
defect from the cartel by refusing to sell to those that comply with the cartel's
price agreement. Maximum resale price fixing accomplishes that purpose. Be-
cause there is no danger of a restriction of output but rather the likelihood of an
increase, the law should welcome the vertical restraint.
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 464 (1966).
65. Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 211.
66. Id. at 213.
67. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
68. Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 213 (quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223).
69. Id. at 214.
70. Id. (citing Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
242-43 (1948); Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941)). In Fashion Originators' Guild, for example, a group of garment and fabric manu-
facturers, the Fashion Originators' Guild of America ("F.O.G.A."), refused to sell its
garments to retailers who also sold garments copied by other manufacturers from designs
19921
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wrongs do not make a right; that is, that Seagram and Calvert
could not justify their antitrust violation by asserting that they
were using it to combat a separate antitrust violation by Kiefer-
Stewart and the other Indiana wholesalers.
The Court treated the Kiefer-Stewart case as a horizontal con-
spiracy to impose maximum resale prices on the wholesalers. Be-
cause Seagram and Calvert were wholly-owned subsidiaries of a
single parent, courts today, following the Supreme Court's 1984
decision, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,1 probably
would treat the two distillers as a single economic entity, incapable
of conspiring with itself and, thus imposing a purely vertical re-
straint on the wholesalers. This fact should not affect any substan-
tive outcome, however, because in the Albrecht case, the Court
directly applied Kiefer-Stewart's reasoning to condemn a wholly
vertical maximum price-fixing arrangement.
B. Albrecht
In Albrecht,72 the defendant, Herald Company, published the
Globe-Democrat, a morning newspaper that it distributed through
independent distributors who bought papers at wholesale and sold
them at retail.73 Herald provided each of its 172 distributors with
an exclusive territory. 4 To prevent price gouging by the distribu-
tors, Herald reserved the right to compete with or ultimately ter-
minate any distributor whose retail prices exceeded a suggested
maximum price advertised by Herald in its paper.75
Albrecht, one of the distributors, adhered to the advertised price
for some time, but ultimately raised his price to customers by ten
of Guild members. Fashion Originators' Guild, 312 U.S. at 461. F.O.G.A. justified its
boycott as necessary to control "style piracy," which it believed to be tortious and an
unfair trade practice. Id. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted:
[T]he unlawful combination [cannot] be justified upon the argument that sys-
tematic copying of dress designs is itself tortious, or should now be declared so
by us. In the first place, whether or not given conduct is tortious is a question
of state law.... In the second place, even if copying were an acknowledged tort
under the law of every state, that situation would not justify petitioners in com-
bining together to regulate and restrain interstate commerce in violation of fed-
eral law.
Id. at 468.
71. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). For a thorough debunking of the Copperweld reasoning and
holding, see Justice Stevens's dissent in that case. Id. at 77906 (Stzc;iia, ., dissenting).
7. A!r c.h v. ijeraia Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
73. Id. at 147.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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cents a month.7 6 After repeated objections, Herald informed Al-
brecht and his customers by letter that Herald itself would deliver
the paper to any customer who wanted it at the lower price.77 Her-
ald then hired Milne Circulation Sales, Inc., a national firm en-
gaged in newspaper subscription solicitation, to engage in
telephone and house-to-house solicitation of all residents of Al-
brecht's territory.7 As a result, 300 of Albrecht's 1200 customers
shifted to direct delivery by Herald.7 9 To service these customers,
Herald advertised that a new route was available without cost. 0
George Kroner, another distributor, took over the route.8 ' Kroner
knew why he received the route without charge, that overcharging
would not be tolerated, and that he might have to return it if Al-
brecht sold his route or discontinued his pricing practice.8 2 Herald
continued selling papers to Albrecht until he filed a Section 1 Sher-
man Act suit, after which Herald terminated Albrecht. 3 Albrecht
subsequently sold his route for more than he paid for it but less
than he could have received had he been able to turn over 1200
instead of 900 customers."4
Albrecht's suit alleged a combination in restraint of trade be-
tween the defendant Herald and Albrecht's customers and/or
Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. and/or George Kroner. 5 The jury
found for the defendant Herald and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 6 The Supreme Court reversed, 7 relying
first on United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 88 to find the existence of
a combination, 9 and then upon Kiefer-Stewart to find the maxi-
mum price-fixing arrangement illegal per se.90 On the price-fixing
issue, the Court stated that schemes to fix maximum prices may
severely impair the buyer's ability to compete because such
schemes substitute "the perhaps erroneous judgment of the seller
76. Id. at 147 & n.2.
77. Id. at 147.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 147-48.
82. Id. at 148.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966).
87. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
88. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
89. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149-50 (citing Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 45).
90. Id. at 149-52 (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).
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for the forces of the competitive market."'" The Court held that
the combination formed by Herald to force Albrecht to maintain a
specified resale price for the newspapers "constituted, without
more, an illegal restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.",92
In reaching its decision, the Albrecht Court catalogued some ad-
ditional potential anticompetitive consequences of maximum price
fixing. First, the price may be set too low to allow the dealer to
furnish the services consumers desire. 93 Second, "maximum price
fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically
advantaged dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant
nonprice competition." 94 Finally, maximum price-fixing schemes
tend to acquire the attributes of minimum price-fixing arrange-
ments "if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme
is nearly always the fixed maximum price, which is increasingly
likely as the maximum price approaches the actual cost of the
dealer." 9
These remarks by the Court are pure dicta, however, because
none of the listed consequences were present in Albrecht. 96 Rather,
the Court decided Albrecht solely on the basis of the fundamental
antitrust principles announced in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Parke & Sons, Inc. 97 and United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. ,"
and applied in Kiefer-Stewart.99 Simply stated, price is to be deter-
mined by the free interplay of market forces, not by the private
91. Id. at 152.
92. Id. at 153.
93. Id. at 152-53.
94. Id. at 153.
95. Id.
96. Although none of the potential anticompetitive consequences of maximum price
fixing were present in Albrecht, one was involved in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc., 182 F.2d 228, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). As
explained by the Court in Albrecht: "In Kiefer-Stewart after the manufacturer established
the maximum price at which its product could be sold, it fair-traded the product so as to
fix that price as the legally permissible minimum." Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153 n.9.
97. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In prohibiting resale price maintenance, the Court in Dr.
Miles stated:
[Wihere commodities have passed into the channels of trade and are owned by
dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent competition and to maintain
prices is not to be determined by the circumstances whether they were produced
by several manufacturers or by one, or whether they were previously owned by
one or by many. The complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory
to itself, the public is entitled to whatever Ad1t-g_ .y ,zC dilouzM com-
petition in the subsequent traffic.
Id. at 408-09.
98. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
99. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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decision of a group of competitors or by a supplier selling its prod-
ucts through independent distributors.'°° Further, price fixing is
illegal per se' 01 and is an expansive concept that includes any com-
bination that tampers with price setting mechanisms. 02 Thus, it is
no defense that the prices set are reasonable, 0 3 that the price fixing
was designed to eliminate some other competitive "abuse" or
"6evil,' °4 or that the defendants had no power to control the mar-
ket.'05 Further, price fixing includes not only agreements to pay or
charge a rigid, uniform price, but also any agreements to alter
prices, whatever machinery is used."
100. As Professor Sullivan has noted, this principle applies equally to minimum and
maximum price fixing:
The policy which insists on individual decisions about price thus has at its
source more than a preference for the independence of the small businessman
(though that is surely there) and more than a preference for the lower prices
which such a policy will usually yield to consumers (though that too is strongly
present). Also at work is the theoretical conviction that the most general func-
tion of the competitive process, the allocation and reallocation of resources in a
rational yet automatic manner, can be carried out only if independence by each
trader is scrupulously required. Created out of the confluence of these parallel
strivings, the policy has a breadth which makes it as forbidding to maximum
price arrangements as to the more common ones which forestall price decreases.
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 78, at 212 (1977).
101. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
102. Id. at 221.
103. Id. As the Court long ago noted, a fixed price is inherently unreasonable:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimina-
tion of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and
unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once estab-
lished, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition
secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable
or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a partic-
ular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the
government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day
to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of eco-
nomic conditions.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
104. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218, 220-22.
105. Id. at 224 n.59.
106. Id. at 222. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348
(1982), the Court reaffirmed the basic principles announced in Socony-Vacuum, Kiefer-
Stewart, and Albrecht and applied those principles to find a horizontal maximum price-
fixing scheme per se illegal. In Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, medical care founda-
tions, by agreement of their member-doctors, fixed the maximum fees that doctors could
recover for medical services provided to patients insured under plans approved by the
foundations. Id. at 339-40. After quoting extensively from Socony- Vacuum, Kiefer-Stew-
art, and Albrecht, the Maricopa County Medical Soc'y Court concluded:
Our decisions foreclose the argument that the agreements at issue escape per se
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C. Criticism of Albrecht
The reasoning outlined above is more than sufficient to dispose
of Kiefer-Stewart, Albrecht, and any other maximum, minimum,
horizontal, or vertical price-fixing case. Yet, Albrecht has been
subjected to harsh criticism, usually based on the assertion that
maximum price fixing is necessary to prevent price gouging by the
independent distributors who enjoy monopoly power in their re-
spective territories. 107 Indeed, virtually all criticism of the per se
rule for maximum price fixing assumes the existence of successive
monopoly. 0 s Critics further assert that if maximum price fixing is
illegal, the only alternative is to vertically integrate into distribu-
tion, thus replacing numerous independent dealers with a monopo-
list. 109 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Albrecht found that the Globe-Democrat's maximum price-fixing
arrangement benefitted the public by fostering competition."10 The
Eighth Circuit reasoned that if the Globe-Democrat was forced to
abandon the arrangement, it would have no other choice but to
terminate the independent carriers and deliver the papers using its
own employees."' As a result, the Globe-Democrat would "auto-
matically become a monopolist.""' 2
Even ignoring the fact that a maximum price is an administered
price and therefore should be presumptively unlawful, criticism of
condemnation because they are horizontal and fix maximum prices. Kiefer-
Stewart and Albrecht place horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices on the
same legal-even if not economic-footing as agreements to fix minimum or
uniform prices. The per se rule "is grounded on faith in price competition as a
market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminat-
ing competition." In this case the rule is violated by a price restraint that tends
to provide the same economic rewards to all practitioners regardless of their
skill, their experience, their training, or their willingness to employ innovative
and difficult procedures in individual cases. Such a restraint also may discour-
age entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new develop-
ments by individual entrepreneurs. It may be a masquerade for an agreement to
fix uniform prices, or it may in the future take on that character.
Id. at 348 (quoting James A. Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule-Preface
and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 137, 142 (1962)).
In November 1990, the Socony- Vacuum holding was emphatically reaffirmed in Palmer
v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 401, 402 (1990) (per curiam). In Palmer, the Court held
that a revenue sharing arrangement between competing bar exam review courses was per
se illegal even without direct agreement on actual prices to be charged. Id. at 403.
107. See sources cited supra note 38.
108. See sources cited supra note 38.
109. See sources cited supra note 38.
110. Alhrp. v.,. ,7 17.26 317, 522 ktn Cir. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 145
(1968).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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the Albrecht rule nevertheless suffers from two fatal and fundamen-
tal errors. These are the fallacious assumptions that (1) airtight
exclusive territories are the only way to distribute newspapers
through independent distributors; and (2) vertical integration into
distribution either is caused by the Albrecht rule, is somehow bad
in itself, or is less efficient than distribution through independent
carriers.
III. TESTING THE VALIDITY OF EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIES
AND MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING IN NEWSPAPER
DISTRIBUTION UNDER THE RULE OF REASON
Arguments favoring maximum price fixing are usually couched
in strong, pro-consumer rhetoric. 1 3 In fact, however, a newspaper
adopting a maximum price-fixing scheme is motivated not by con-
cern for consumers, but by the desire to keep the retail price of the
paper artificially low (in fact, below cost) 1 1 4 to increase circulation
and thereby maximize advertising revenues. Also lost in the rheto-
ric is any consideration of why the distributors have the ability to
charge supracompetitive prices. The answer is simple: because the
newspaper set up the distributors in airtight exclusive territories.
For example, Professor Hovenkamp repeatedly criticizes the Al-
brecht holding as an impediment to policing the distributors' "nat-
ural monopoly" without ever explaining from where the monopoly
came or why it is natural.1 5 This is typical of anti-Albrecht com-
mentary, which invariably assumes that the exclusive territories
are legal.
In fact, however, the presumptive illegality of exclusive territo-
ries is apparent from the fact that price fixing is necessary to police
them, a point Justice White clearly enunciated in Albrecht. He
stated that the exclusive territories could not be presumed valid
and that "[t]he assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because
it blunts the pernicious consequences of another distribution prac-
tice is unpersuasive." 6 Justice White noted that if the economic
113. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 110-12.
114. See infra note 156.
115. See Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 452-54, 461.
Hovenkamp consistently refers to the carriers' natural monopoly without any supporting
authority, see, e.g., id., except for a brief note which is simply a theoretical economic
argument with a graph, id. at 452-54 & n. 17. Interestingly, Professors Blair and Fesmire
cite Professor Hovenkamp's argument for the proposition that newspaper distribution is a
natural monopoly. Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 38, at 76 n. 127.
116. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968). In this passage, Justice
White cited United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967), which
held that vertical nonprice restrictions imposed in conjunction with the sale of goods
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effect of the exclusive territories established by the newspaper "was
such that the public could be protected only by otherwise illegal
price fixing itself injurious to the public, the entire distribution
scheme must fall under § 1 of the Sherman Act."' l17
Despite this basic observation, the anti-Albrecht forces seem
willing to ignore the basic mandates of rule of reason analysis in
judging the legality of restricted newspaper distribution systems.
Under rule of reason analysis, a court must answer three questions:
(1) what is the harm or potential harm to competition resulting
from the challenged restraint; (2) what is the object of the restraint
and is it legitimate and significant; and (3) are less restrictive alter-
natives, causing fewer harms to competition, available to the col-
laborators to achieve the legitimate objectives of the restraint. ' 8
The typical Albrecht-style newspaper distribution system of exclu-
sive territories coupled with maximum price fixing fails to with-
stand antitrust scrutiny under this rule of reason standard.
A. Harm to Competition and Purpose of the Restraint
The Court noted in both Albrecht " 9 and Kiefer-Stewart ,20 that
the harm to competition involved in maximum price fixing is ap-
parent. Suppliers administer pricing decisions to their customers.
As a result, independent businesses are unable to determine the
prices to charge for their goods based on their own costs and their
competitors' actions.' 2' Despite this basic consequence, critics of
were per se illegal. Schwinn was overruled in 1977 by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which substituted a rule of reason standard. As devel-
oped below, the exclusive territories in Albrecht fail to meet even this more lenient stan-
dard. For an extended critique of GTE Sylvania and its consequences, see Roszkowski,
supra note 19.
117. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153-54.
118. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GEN-
ERAL ISSUES 2 (1981); see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 38, 1502.
119. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
120. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
121. The inquiry into the legality of vertical maximum price fixing should be, as
Professors Flynn and Ponsoldt note:
conducted with a presumption of illegality because the impact of the restraint
severely curtails the rights of distributors to succeed or fail through a competi-
tive process. In cases where maximum price fixing takes place, be it horizontal
or vertical, the markets involved are usually characterized by a virtually com-
plete departure from the ideal of a perfectly competitive market.
Assumption of power by a monopolistic supplier, or by a horizontal agree-
ment among distrihnitnr_ m, _ z -.-. :.. , a direct dispiacement of the
competitive process of price determination. It is an assumption of power by the
proponent of the restraint, denying rights of distributors and consumers to
make their own judgments about pricing-a denial of rights guaranteed by the
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Albrecht nevertheless assume that maximum price fixing is some-
how procompetitive. For example, the court of appeals in Albrecht
reasoned that Herald's maximum price policy actually complied
with antitrust law by insuring competition. 22 The Eighth Circuit
observed that a home delivery system is monopolistic by nature
whether routes are handled by independent merchants, such as the
Albrecht plaintiff, or by the publisher itself.' 23 The court con-
cluded that the "public's protection from the harmful effects there-
from can be guaranteed only by preventing overcharging through
insuring competition."' 24
It is difficult to see just what "competition" is promoted by a
newspaper's maximum price-fixing policy. The distributors, set up
in airtight exclusive territories, do not compete with each other.
They, therefore, have no incentive to provide adequate service or to
charge their customers less than the advertised maximum price.
Indeed, there is no suggestion in Albrecht that any distributor
charged less than the advertised maximum. The only possible
competition occurs between the newspaper and rogue distributors
such as Albrecht who fail to toe the maximum price line. Thus, all
customers ultimately pay the same administered retail price for the
paper, even though there are many supposedly independent "com-
petitors" selling it. 125
Justice Harlan's dissent in Albrecht also is instructive on the
goals of anti-trust policy. Congress did not leave to the proponents of such
restraints the authority to determine unilaterally the scope of the contract rights
of distributors. Similarly, Congress did not intend the proponents of maximum
price fixing to determine what the best price should be for the benefit of the
public.
John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical
Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Anti-
trust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1149 (1987).
122. Albrecht, 367 F.2d at 522.
123. Id. at 523.
124. Id.
125. Professor Areeda devotes nearly 60 pages of his treatise to criticizing Albrecht, 8
AREEDA, supra note 38, 11 1634-41, at 392-451, but musters only one paragraph in
response to the "dealer freedom" argument, which as previously discussed, is the sole
basis of the Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart holdings. See supra notes 93-105 and accompa-
nying text. Areeda states:
As one of its grounds for condemnation, the Supreme Court's Albrecht decision
objected that vertical agreements limiting maximum prices would "cripple the
freedom of traders." A reluctance to allow manufacturers to control a dealer's
freedom to dispose as he saw fit of goods he owned was hinted in Dr. Miles and
apparently made decisive in Schwinn's approach to vertical non-price restraints.
The latter case, however, was overruled by GTE Sylvania, in which the
Supreme Court rejected the dealer freedom rationale as grounds for condemn-
ing vertical non-price restraints. The rejection seems equally applicable here,
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competition issue. In attempting to justify a more lenient standard
for maximum than minimum price-fixing schemes, he stated:
because dealer autonomy provides no basis for distinguishing desirable from
undesirable restraints, for all of them restrain dealer freedom.
8 AREEDA, supra note 38, 1637d, at 406-07 (quoting Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152 (quoting
Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 213)).
The Court's holding in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977), is indefensible, however, because inter alia, its "rule of reason" standard gov-
erning "nonprice" vertical restraints requires an impossible balancing of an admitted re-
straint on intrabrand competition against only arguable benefits to interbrand
competition. See Roszkowski, supra note 19, at 158. Even if such an intrabrand-inter-
brand balancing is possible, it is clearly inappropriate for cases like Albrecht in which
there is no interbrand competition to balance against the restraint on intrabrand competi-
tion. Id Further, GTE Sylvania expressly limited its holding to nonprice restraints, 433
U.S. at 51 n.18, not price restraints such as those involved in Albrecht. Moreover, GTE
Sylvania announced a rule of reason, not a per se legal standard for nonprice vertical
restraints, such as exclusive territories. Id. at 57-59. As developed in this Article, such
restraints in the newspaper distribution context failed to withstand scrutiny under the
rule of reason.
It is also interesting to note that Professor Areeda cites footnote 21 of the GTE Sylva-
nia opinion, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21, as authority for the proposition that the Court has
rejected the dealer freedom rationale as grounds for condemning vertical non-price re-
straints. 8 AREEDA, supra note 38, 1637d, at 407 n. 18. Similarly, Judge Easterbrook
cites footnote 21 as "explicitly reject[ing] any analysis that makes antitrust cases turn on
the 'autonomy of independent businessmen.'" Easterbrook, supra note 38, at 888.
Footnote 21 is the GTE Sylvania Court's response to Judge Browning's dissent in the
court of appeals opinion, GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc. 537 F.2d 980,
1018-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (Browning, J., dissenting). In defending the Schwinn rule of per
se illegality for nonprice vertical restraints, Judge Browning stated:
The jury's verdict determined that Sylvania restricted the territory in which
Continental could resell television sets purchased from Sylvania. Where to sell
is a crucial business question. The answer determines the markets in which the
seller will compete. Thus, Sylvania interfered with the exercise of Continental's
business judgment in a way that significantly impaired Continental's freedom to
compete.
Sylvania's conduct toward Continental thwarted an important purpose of the
Sherman Act. Legislative history and Supreme Court decisions establish that a
principal objective of the Sherman Act was to protect the right of independent
business entities to make their own competitive decisions, free of coercion, col-
lusion, or exclusionary practices.
Congress' general purpose in passing the Sherman Act was to limit and re-
strain accumulated economic power, represented by the trusts, and to restore
and preserve a system of free competitive enterprise. The congressional debates
reflect a concern not only with the consumer interest in price, quality, and
quantity of goods and services but also with society's interest in the protection
of the independent businessman, for reasons of social and political as well as
economic policy.
Id. at 1018-19 (emphasis added). In response, the Supreme Court stated:
We are ... unable to accept Judge Browning's interpretation of Schwinn. In
his dissent hplenw 1- -- A U-- -U- I-a.t ithzC ji c view that the bnerman
Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent busi-
nessmen even though they have no impact on "price, quality, and quantity of
goods and services." This view is certainly not explicit in Schwinn, which pur-
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[P]rice floors are invariably harmful on balance. Price ceilings
are a different matter: they do not lessen horizontal competition;
they drive prices toward the level that would be set by intense
competition, and they cannot go below this level unless the man-
ufacturer who dictates them and the customer who accepts them
have both miscalculated. Since price ceilings reflect the manufac-
turer's view that there is insufficient competition to drive prices
down to a competitive level, they have the arguable justification
that they prevent retailers or wholesalers from reaping monopoly
or supercompetitive profits. 126
Each of Justice Harlan's assertions, however, is open to serious
question. First, as noted above, price ceilings do not lessen hori-
zontal competition because there is no horizontal competition to
lessen. Second, only the market can determine what prices "would
be set by intense competition" so that the manufacturer's opinion
that insufficient retail competition exists, does not justify adminis-
tered pricing. Finally, any lack of retail competition enabling the
ports to be based on an examination of the "impact [of the restrictions] upon
the marketplace." Competitive economies have social and political as well as
economic advantages... but an antitrust policy divorced from market consider-
ations would lack any objective benchmarks.
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The
Court's interpretation of Judge Browning's argument is clearly wrong. Nowhere does
Judge Browning say that the Sherman Act prohibits restraints on the autonomy of in-
dependent businesses "divorced from market considerations" such as the impact of the
practice on the "price, quality, and quantity of goods and services." Clearly, market
impact can be inferred from privately imposed restrictions on a reseller's prices, territo-
ries, locations, or customers. For discussion by Professor Sullivan of such an impact in
the vertical price context, see supra note 100.
Further, GTE Sylvania's lack of concern for dealer autonomy is grossly out of step
with both Sherman Act legislative history, see, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental
T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1018-19 n.l (9th Cir. 1976) (Browning, J., dissenting) (disputing
the majority's opinion that "the sole legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act had as
its goal the promotion of consumer welfare"), and a long line of Supreme Court cases
including Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht. As Justice White noted in GTE Sylvania:
[W]hile according some weight to the businessman's interest in controlling the
terms on which he trades in his own goods may be anathema to those who view
the Sherman Act as directed solely to economic efficiency, this principle is with-
out question more deeply embedded in our cases than the notions of "free rider"
effects and distributional efficiencies borrowed by the majority from the "new
economics of vertical relationships."
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 68-69 (White, J., concurring in judgment only). Thus, in
contrast to the sound precedential and policy bases supporting Kiefer-Stewart and Al-
brecht, their harsh neoclassical critics, preoccupied with conferring "an absolute right of
freedom of contract to the proponent of vertical restraints," utilize "an analytical process
based on unrealistic assumptions of fact used to dictate policy designed to maximize an
extreme view of private contract and property rights." Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note
121, at 1149-50.
126. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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distributors to reap monopoly profits is caused by the exclusive ter-
ritories created by the manufacturer. In sum, none of Justice
Harlan's purported justifications dictates anything but a rule of per
se illegality for vertical maximum price fixing.
Virtually all criticism of the Albrecht rule is based upon the
"control of successive monopoly" economic paradigm. Under this
paradigm, monopoly exists at two stages of a product's distribu-
tion-for example, manufacturing and distribution. The effect of
such an arrangement is a compound monopoly resulting in higher
prices and lower output than if only the manufacturing stage is
monopolized. If the monopoly pricing effects of the downstream
monopolist can be eliminated (for example, by vertical integration
of the upstream monopolist into distribution) 2 7 or controlled (for
example, by maximum price fixing imposed by the upstream on the
downstream monopolist), prices, although still at a monopoly
level, will be lower and output will be higher. 128 Critics assert that
Albrecht's maximum price-fixing rule is wrong because it elimi-
nates an important tool for the control of successive monopoly.
This argument, although perhaps defensible as a matter of eco-
nomic theory, fails to square with the facts of actual maximum
price-fixing cases. For example, Professors Blair and Fesmire as-
sert that "maximum resale pricing occurs in market settings where
firms operating in two successive stages of production and distribu-
tion possess monopoly power."'' 29 In other articles, Professor Blair
and his co-authors hedge somewhat, requiring only "market
power" at successive stages, 30 but nevertheless assert that "a sup-
plier invariably uses maximum resale price fixing to prevent its dis-
tributors from exploiting their market power."' 3'
In fact, however, the vertical maximum price-fixing cases vary
widely from the economic paradigm. For example, in Kiefer-Stew-
art, Calvert and Seagram may have enjoyed some market power,
though certainly no monopoly, because of consumer brand loyalty.
The wholesalers clearly possessed no market power except that
created by their alleged horizontal price-fixing conspiracy. Even
127. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 725c
(1978) ("Integration of two successive monopolies can lead to a higher output and a
lower end-product price.").
128. For an extended economic discussion of this paradigm, see Blair & Kaserman,
The Albrecht Rule, supra note 38, at 466-75.
129. Blair & Fesmire. Marlf,,i,, 1-,!,g, , note s, at 00.
130. Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule, supra note 38, at 464-65; Blair & Schafer,
Evolutionary Models, supra note 38, at 999.
131. Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule, supra note 38, at 464.
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assuming market power was present and that Calvert and Seagram
were motivated by a desire to protect consumers from the effects of
the wholesaler cartel, maximum price fixing is not the answer. As
Justice Black noted in Kiefer-Stewart and the Court has noted on
other occasions including Albrecht, there are better ways to remedy
an antitrust violation than with another antitrust violation. 132 In
addition, Calvert's and Seagram's purported altruistic motive in
Kiefer-Stewart certainly is questionable given the fact that after fix-
ing maximum prices, they fair-traded their products, thus fixing
the maximum price as the legally permissible minimum. 133
In Albrecht, the Globe-Democrat was not the sole newspaper in
St. Louis, and Professor Hovenkamp argues that even a sole local
newspaper is not a monopolist because it competes in the advertis-
ing market, not the market for the sale of newspapers. ' 34 Further,
as developed above, the distributors' "monopoly" was not "natu-
ral" but rather was created by the newspaper's grant of territorial
exclusivity to the distributors. 135
132. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951);
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968); see supra notes 69-70 and accompa-
nying text.
133. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 182 F.2d 228, 231 (7th
Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
134. Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 456-60.
135. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Jack Walters presents considerations similar to those presented in Albrecht. Jack Walters
& Sons, Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984); see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. In Jack Walters, the plaintiff, Wai-
ters, a dealer in Morton's prefabricated buildings, had been established in an exclusive
territory by Morton. Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 707. Periodically, Morton would adver-
tise special deals on its buildings. Id. at 706. To assure that its dealers honored the sale
price, Morton took various steps including: threatening noncomplying dealers with ter-
mination, offering to sell directly to the public at the advertised price, and "shopping" the
dealers to assure compliance. Id. Walters apparently charged higher than the advertised
price in part because its wholesale discounts from Morton during sale periods were less
than the difference between the regular retail price and the advertised price. Id.
As in Albrecht and the other maximum price-fixing cases, the successive monopoly
paradigm does not fit Jack Walters. Morton, though perhaps possessing some monopoly
power in the prefabricated farm building market (assuming that is a market), is certainly
no monopolist. Further, as in Albrecht, the distributors possess market power only be-
cause the manufacturer set them up in exclusive territories. Again as in Albrecht, the
price fixing, which is thought necessary to police distributor price gouging, is itself pre-
sumptive evidence of the illegality of the initial creation of exclusive territories.
In addition, as in Albrecht, there are less restrictive alternatives available to a manufac-
turer to achieve its goals other than exclusive territories coupled with maximum price
fixing. For example, a manufacturer could advertise that the sale price is available at
"participating dealers." If there are enough franchised dealers to provide some in-
trabrand competition, customers will quickly find a dealer honoring the sale price. Or,
the manufacturer could simply provide rebates directly to customers during the sale pe-
riod. This practice is commonly used to sell hundreds of products from hair dryers to
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Finally, the ARCO case departs most graphically from the suc-
cessive monopoly paradigm. 136 Although possessing some market
automobiles. Or, as in Jack Walters, the manufacturer could engage in limited dual
distribution.
136. One might argue that ARCO provides an independent basis for rejecting the
Albrecht rule: maximum resale price maintenance provides a firm facing vigorous inter-
brand competition and desiring to increase volume through lower prices, with a method
of ensuring that its downstream retailers, who may not face vigorous intrabrand competi-
tion, will implement the strategy. Although plausible, such facts have not been involved
in any litigated case, including ARCO.
In ARCO, the plaintiffs alleged that their wholesale price was more than the defend-
ant's retail price. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1896 n.2
(1990) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting 31 of plaintiff's amended complaint). Because
the major oil companies, such as ARCO, supply both the independents and their own
dealers, the ARCO facts appear to present a classic "price squeeze" rather than any legiti-
mate attempt to compete with the independents. See, e.g., Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 811 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a monopolization judg-
ment was supported in part by evidence that Kaiser raised its raw material prices to
independent fabricators of aluminum drainage pipe to the same level that Kaiser charged
for finished pipe).
Also lending support to the plaintiff's theory in ARCO are the following recent devel-
opments. First, in Rebel Oil Co., v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. CV-S-90-076 PMP (RJJ)
(D. Nev. filed Mar. 27, 1990), a discount gasoline marketer sued ARCO alleging that it
has successfully accomplished in Las Vegas what the ARCO plaintiffs argued it was at-
tempting to do in Los Angeles. Protection Order in Predation Case Limits Discovery to
Market Share, Entry Barrier, 59 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1491, p.
703 (Nov. 15, 1990). The complaint, alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act charged the following:
ARCO schemed to lower its wholesale price of gasoline in Las Vegas below its
cost and below its comparable prices in Los Angeles, despite the higher costs of
transporting gasoline 250 miles by pipeline from Los Angeles to Las Vegas.
ARCO allegedly coerced its independent dealers to fix the ARCO pump prices
at correspondingly below-cost, predatory levels. As a result, ARCO's share of
the Las Vegas market allegedly went from zero to at least an estimated 65% to
80% in less than five years. According to REBEL, every significant independ-
ent discount gasoline marketer in Las Vegas, except REBEL, was put out of
business by ARCO's predation.
Ia
Second, on April 9, 1991, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona introduced the Motor
Fuel Consumer Protection Act (S790), which, inter alia, prohibits refiners from control-
ling the operation of retail gas stations. S. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Senator
DeConcini noted a recent rapid decline in the number of independent dealers and stated,
"It would be a grave mistake for us to sit idly by while the major oil refiners gradually
squeeze the independent dealer, and competition, from the gasoline market, only to find
ourselves held hostage by the next oil crisis." 60 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1512, p. 554 (Apr. 18, 1991). DeConcini further noted that the oil companies
"are waging a systematic campaign to eliminate independently operated service stations
from the market by selling gasoline at company operated service stations below the
wholesale price charged to independent dealers." Id. A similar bill was intrnA-d -. :- -
Houqe nf Ii;y i9"ii by Kepresentative Michael Synar. H.R. 2966,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Third, in July 1991, Senator Paul Simon of Illinois spoke on the Senate floor of "grow-
ing evidence to suggest that major oil companies are selling motor fuel to their own affili-
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power, ARCO is far short of a monopolist. Its dealers, either indi-
vidually or collectively, possess no market power except that cre-
ated by their participation in ARCO's maximum price-fixing
conspiracy. The purpose of ARCO's maximum price-fixing con-
spiracy was not to control its retailers' monopoly pricing, but in-
stead to drive independent retailers out of business.1 31
In short, the assertion that "the fixing of maximum resale prices
occurs only in the presence of successive monopoly" 1 3 is false. In-
deed, none of the three Supreme Court cases on the subject in-
volves successive monopoly. Therefore, it is clear that the
successive monopoly paradigm, which is the primary basis of Al-
brecht criticism, provides no support for rejecting the rule of per se
illegality for maximum price fixing.
Unlike resale price maintenance, whose claim to legality rests
upon merely arguable benefits to interbrand competition, 39 maxi-
mum resale price fixing has a legitimate goal when used in its most
common context-newspaper distribution. That goal is to maxi-
mize circulation and thus advertising revenue by keeping the retail
ated service stations at wholesale or below wholesale prices, undercutting and squeezing
the wholesalers who purchase oil from the major oil companies and supply the independ-
ent service stations." 137 Cong. Rec. S9963 (daily ed. July 15, 1991) (statement of Sena-
tor Simon).
Fourth, on September 11, 1991, in hearings before the Senate Small Business Commit-
tee, various independent marketers testified to anticompetitive pricing practices by major
oil companies. 61 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1532, p. 320 (Sept. 12,
1991). For example, Sam Carter, an independent marketer, stated that in the past 18
months, 26 independent retailers that he formerly had supplied, went out of business,
noting "major oil companies are driving independent marketers and retailers out of busi-
ness by temporarily subsidizing the retail price of gasoline." Id.
Finally, independent marketers expressed similar sentiments on September 23, 1991, in
hearings on HR 2966 before two subcommittees of the House Small Business Committee.
61 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1534, p. 372 (Sept. 26, 1991). One
witness, Mel Sherbert, General Counsel of the Service Station Dealers of America, testi-
fied that over 8,000 independent retailers were driven out of business during 1990 by the
major refiners' price inversion practices. Id.
137. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores,
Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989), involves considerations similar to those presented in
ARCO. In this case, Indiana Grocery, a chain controlling 23% of the Indianapolis gro-
cery market, sued under § 1 of the Sherman Act alleging a maximum price-fixing con-
spiracy between another chain, Super Valu Stores, Inc., and its local franchisee of a low-
cost, no-frills supermarket. Id. at 1411-12. Once again, no successive monopoly was
involved and control of downstream price gouging was not in issue. Such a conspiracy
(as in ARCO, allegedly created to drive the plaintiff out of business), if proven, has no
procompetitive justification and accordingly should be per se illegal. The fact that Indi-
ana Grocery's evidence, both of conspiracy and competitive harm, was apparently far
weaker than USA Petroleum's, is irrelevant in determining the content of the substantive
rule applicable to the case.
138. Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 38, at 76.
139. See Roszkowski, supra note 19, at 147-49.
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price of the paper very low-in fact, lower than the cost of the
paper and ink used to print it. Thus, consistent with the applica-
tion of general rule of reason analysis, it is necessary to examine
whether alternatives that are less restrictive to competition are
available in order to achieve this goal.
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Albrecht critics fail to consider whether alternatives, less restric-
tive to competition, are available to achieve the legitimate goals of
the restraint. Several alternatives are available, but these are never
mentioned in the extensive anti-Albrecht commentary. Most alter-
natives are similar to the devices used to achieve the stated
procompetitive goals of resale price maintenance and nonprice ver-
tical restraints. An example illustrates the problem.
A newspaper wants to distribute its product at an extremely low
resale price, a price below its cost of manufacture, in order to max-
imize circulation and therefore advertising revenues. It must, how-
ever, distribute its paper through independent distributors because
it lacks the economic or administrative means to integrate forward
into distribution. Assuming that a system of exclusive territories
coupled with maximum price fixing is illegal, the newspaper could,
for example, appoint a number of distributors and give them areas
of "primary responsibility." In this area, a distributor would be
obligated to serve any customer requesting service. The newspaper
or an independent subscription service would procure new sub-
scribers and assign them to the distributor responsible for the new
subscriber's address. The contract also may require the distribu-
tors actively to solicit new customers within their areas of primary
responsibility, for which they would be compensated on a commis-
sion or other basis. The newspaper might use other financial incen-
tives to induce distributors to solicit new subscriptions in their
areas.
Once the areas of primary responsibility are established, the
newspaper sells papers to the various distributors at a price it finds
satisfactory. To help keep the resale price low, the newspaper
might use a variety of devices. First, the newspaper might appoint
the distributors for automatically renewable short terms, subject to
termination by giving notice within a fixed period prior to the expi-
ration of each term. This would allow the newspaper to expedi-
tiously and unilaterally terminate a price-gouginL, distrbitr 4° ' r
140. Price gouging should not be a problem if competition is ensured as outlined
here.
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one who otherwise failed adequately to serve its area of primary
responsibility. As in Albrecht, the terminated distributor should be
given a reasonable time to sell its distributorship, including its
trucks and other assets, to a suitable buyer. Second, distributors
would not be limited to customers within their areas of primary
responsibility, but could solicit new or existing customers any-
where the paper is sold. The newspaper would notify all subscrib-
ers that they are not obligated to use their assigned distributor, and
would provide them with the names and advertising literature of
all distributors. The newspaper might give preferential advertising
rates to its distributors for advertisements concerning prices and
services, and provide allowances for other forms of advertising (for
example, yellow page advertisements or flyers distributed door-to-
door). 4 ' Finally, the newspaper would reserve the right to com-
pete with any distributor for any customer. 4 2
A system such as this would initially ensure that each subscriber
has a distributor obligated to serve her. If at any time the sub-
scriber became dissatisfied with her distributor's service for any
reason-high price, late delivery, nondelivery, rude employees, wet
papers when it rains-she could simply look in the phone book or
the newspaper for the name of a competing distributor. Distribu-
tors would be free to compete on any basis they choose, and they
would be aware that customers can easily be lost if the price is too
high or service poor. Overall prices should drop to a competitive
level and the newspaper, if it desires, can expand output by lower-
ing the wholesale price or by providing distributor incentives for
new subscriptions. Although such a system is apparently worka-
ble, 1 43 all of the existing commentary nevertheless assumes that ex-
141. In smaller towns, it may not even be necessary to assign areas of primary re-
sponsibility because, in such localities, all distributors are physically capable of delivering
anywhere the newspaper is sold. Thus, new subscribers would simply be given the names
and advertising literature of all distributors and told to take their pick.
142. Professor Hovenkamp argues that this option is foreclosed by Albrecht: "Al-
brecht indicates that competitive entry is an illegal form of discipline for carriers charging
too high a price." Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 463. In fact, how-
ever, Albrecht found the combination providing competition illegal because it was formed
with specific intent to enforce an explicit maximum price arrangement on its dealers, a
price-fixing arrangement the Court found per se illegal. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 153 (1968). In contrast, in the distribution system proposed here, price is deter-
mined solely by competition among the distributors and between any or all of the distrib-
utors and the newspaper. The prospect of competition by the newspaper simply provides
an additional check on supracompetitive pricing by any distributor.
143. Any business involving servicing a route in a given locality (dairy, parcel service,
garbage hauling) would prefer, as more "efficient," to have all of its pickups or deliveries
concentrated in a given neighborhood. Nevertheless, such businesses routinely compete
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clusive territories enforced by maximum price fixing are the only
alternative to vertical integration. By failing to consider less re-
strictive alternatives, apologists for maximum price fixing misapply
basic antitrust analysis to achieve their preordained result.
IV. THE SPECTER OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Assume, arguendo, that the Albrecht critics are correct and that
without exclusive territories and maximum price fixing, vertical in-
tegration, which eliminates independent distributors, is the only
way for a newspaper to achieve its unique below-cost distribution
goal. This "specter of vertical integration" argument often is used
generically to support arguments to eliminate any scrutiny of verti-
cal restraints, including minimum and maximum price fixing and
nonprice restraints. I" This concern for independent competitors is
curious, however, because the Chicago School and the Albrecht
critics generally applaud vertical integration and vertical merger
due to their alleged procompetitive consequences. For example,
Professor Hovenkamp stated: "Vertical integration, even when un-
dertaken by a monopolist, is not generally inefficient or harmful to
consumers.'45 Vertical integration often reduces transaction costs
and consumers generally benefit when firms can operate more effi-
ciently and cheaply."'" This statement is typical of the volumi-
nous Chicago School commentary on vertical integration, either by
over wide geographic areas for scattered customers who are able to choose on the tradi-
tional bases of price, quality, and service.
In many localities, for example, garbage hauling is done by private firms, rather than
by the municipality. For example, in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, the location of the
University of Illinois, with a population of approximately 100,000, garbage hauling is
done privately, and the 1991-92 Yellow Pages list 20 independent private haulers. Firms
compete for customers throughout the entire locality, which results in each firm having
an unwieldy route of widely scattered customers. The individual firms offer a wide vari-
ety of pickup options, dumpster and other container renials, and prices. Customers can
shop around and can switch virtually overnight from a hauler charging too much or
providing poor service. Contrast this situation (which is analogous to the newspaper
distribution system outlined in the text) to a municipal system (which is analogous to the
Albrecht system) in which consumers are stuck with their designated supplier, who may
charge too much and provide poor service.
144. See Roszkowski, supra note 19, at 149-50.
145. Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 464 & n.49 (citing 3 AREEDA
& TURNER, supra note 127, 725a-b; BORK, PARADOX, supra note 9, at 237-45; RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 196-201 (1976)).
146. Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 464 & n.50 (citing FREDERIC
M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 89-91(2d ed. 1980)): Oliver E. Willianmnv, A--_ ' 2.- .- l ",k; iciins. Antitrust
Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979)). Profes-
sor Hovenkamp notes that an example of the kinds of cost savings that a newspaper can
achieve by vertically integrating its delivery system appears in BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE,
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new entry or merger, which is virtually uniform in its praise of (or
at least lack of antitrust concern for) the practice.'47
The Chicago School particularly supports vertical integration
that eliminates an upstream or downstream monopolist, even if, as
in newspaper distribution, the integrating firm also is a monopolist.
The justification is the same "control of successive monopoly" ar-
gument supporting maximum price fixing. 48 In sum, the Chicago
School supports vertical integration generally even by a monopolist
and particularly when it eliminates another monopolist from the
distribution chain.
One would therefore expect the Chicago School enthusiastically
to support vertical integration in newspaper distribution when the
newspaper, which may or may not be a monopoly, eliminates the
monopoly distributors by vertical integration. Yet, curiously in
this case, vertical integration becomes a "second-best" alternative
dictated by the Albrecht decision. For example, Professor
Hovenkamp criticized Albrecht for holding maximum price fixing
illegal per se. ' 49 He observed:
The route carriers were monopolists who could maximize their
profits by reducing output and charging a higher price for deliv-
ering newspapers. The result, of course, was lower circulation
THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY IN THE 1980s: AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMICS AND
TECHNOLOGY 44-48 (1980).
147. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
723.1-736.2 (Supp. 1991); HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 192-209; BORK,
PARADOX, supra note 9, at 226; Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38; Frank
H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of the Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135 (1984); Posner, supra note 38.
148. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. As Professor Hovenkamp
noted:
Whenever vertical integration eliminates transactions with a monopolist, how-
ever, the result will be higher profits for the integrating firm and lower prices
for consumers, provided that the integrating firm can produce the product or
service as efficiently as the monopolist did. A firm that suspects it is paying
monopoly prices for a particular product or service will be highly motivated to
provide that product or service for itself.
Vertical integration has been perceived as particularly pernicious when the
integrating firm is a monopolist. However, the above rule holds true even for
the monopolist: the monopolist that can eliminate another monopolist from its
distribution chain will make more profits and will have a lower profit-maximiz-
ing price.
The economic effects of eliminating a monopolist from a distribution chain
are the same whether the vertical integration occurs by new entry or by
merger. ...
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 195-97; see 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 127, 725c.
149. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 198.
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and lower profits for the newspaper, as well as higher prices to
the consumer. A firm forbidden by the antitrust laws to protect
itself from monopoly pricing will likely choose the second-best
alternative-perhaps outright termination of the independent
carriers and their replacement by employees of the newspaper. 3 0
Professor Hovenkamp's concern for the independent carriers is
indeed surprising given two basic observations. First, the current
law of nonprice vertical restraints, which is based upon Chicago
School theory, exhibits no concern for the fate of independent deal-
ers. That law, derived from Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc. ,13 is expressly designed to elevate supplier over small
dealer interest, and to permit suppliers (often in collusion with
powerful dealers) to control the nature of downstream competition
by controlling the retail dealer's prices, territories, locations, and
customers.1 2 Second, like its nonprice vertical restraint theory,
the Chicago School vertical integration and merger theory also ex-
hibits no concern for the fate of independent dealers. For example,
in criticizing the Supreme Court's vertical merger case law, Profes-
sor Hovenkamp advised:
In spite of their extraordinary potential for creating efficiency
and their rather limited threat of economic harm, vertical merg-
ers have not fared well under the antitrust laws. Most of the law
of vertical mergers was written at a time when protection of small
businesses rather than encouragement of efficiency was the under-
lying antitrust policy. Efficiency-creating vertical mergers invaria-
bly injure smaller, unintegrated rivals. 3'
In sum, bedrock Chicago School theory assumes that vertical
practices of all types-resale price maintenance, nonprice vertical
restraints, and vertical integration either through new entry or
merger-are beneficial and should virtually always be legal.
Equally fundamental to Chicago School theory is the primacy of
manufacturer over independent retailer interests evidenced by an
utter lack of concern for preservation of intrabrand competition
150. Id.
151. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
152. See Roszkowski, supra note 19, at 153.
153. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 202-03 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). Note that vertical integration by a newspaper into distribution often resembles
entry by merger rather than internal expansion. In most cases, existing distributors sim-
ply become employees of the newspaper. See AREEDA & HovF. V A! . 7,
79..., a-,, 712. I., my event, klovenkamp asserts that the competitive consequences of
eliminating a monopolist are the same whether vertical integration occurs by merger or
new entry. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 197.
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that GTE Sylvania and its progeny have grafted onto modem anti-
trust law.
One then legitimately wonders why, in the minute backwater of
newspaper distribution, the Chicago School suddenly turns full cir-
cle and evidences concern for the fate of the independent carriers.
The answer is that such a position is required to support their re-
lentless assault on the Albrecht holding that maximum price fixing
is per se illegal. Newspaper distribution is the only context in
which even an arguable justification for maximum price fixing can
be articulated. 5 4 Without the argument that maximum price fix-
ing preserves independent dealers against the specter of vertical in-
tegration, the anti-Albrecht rhetoric loses most of its force.
As previously noted, the bankruptcy of Albrecht criticism is fur-
ther exposed by the fact that the allegedly "independent" carriers
who are eliminated do not compete in any meaningful sense, and
that their alleged "natural" monopoly was in fact created by the
newspaper. 155 The real reason newspapers integrate into distribu-
tion is not an Albrecht handcuff, as the Chicago School asserts, but
because, as these commentators would assert in any other context,
it is more efficient to do so. A newspaper, unlike virtually any
other supplier, sells its product below cost 156 to maximize circula-
tion and therefore advertising revenue. This characteristic alone
ultimately may dictate a company-owned distribution system. In-
deed, many newspapers in recent years have vertically integrated
154. As the Court in Kiefer-Stewart found, the assertion that maximum price fixing is
necessary to control a downstream cartel is not a legitimate argument. Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951); see supra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text.
155. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
156. See Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 455 n. 19 (citing CHRIS-
TOPHER H. STERLING & TIMOTHY R. HAIGHT, THE MASS MEDIA: ASPEN INSTITUTE
GUIDE TO COMMUNICATION INDUSTRY TRENDS 166 (1978) (1976 revenue from circula-
tion for a typical newspaper with circulation of 250,000 was $7,256,686 and expenses for
newsprint and ink were $9,391,241); McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57, 62
(C.D. Cal. 1975) (Times Mirror subscription price was less than it paid for its newsprint)
and quoting Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 4, Al-
brecht (No. 43)("[a] typical daily newspaper in the 240,000 circulation range spent, in
1966, $4,411,283.05 on newsprint and ink, while it received only $2,948,318.24 in total
circulation income.")). Commenting on these authorities, Professor Hovenkamp noted:
In short, the marginal revenue that can be obtained from the circulation price of
a newspaper is less than the marginal cost of producing it. Furthermore, the
above figures understate the marginal cost, for they do not consider other varia-
ble costs of production in addition to newsprint and ink, such as labor, mechan-
ical costs, and utilities. Costs for editorial staff, building, and advertising of the
newspaper itself should be regarded as fixed and, therefore, should not be calcu-
lated into marginal cost.
Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration, supra note 38, at 455 n.19.
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into distribution and have survived antitrust challenges by termi-
nated distributors.'57 In discussing these cases, Professor Areeda
concludes that "it appears that publishers have increasingly inte-
grated forward into self-distribution in order to achieve efficiency
and to prevent the undermining of circulation goals by independ-
ent dealers."'5 8
Thus, it is not clear that the Albrecht rule is the cause of the
trend toward vertical integration in the newspaper industry. Even
if it is, it is not clear that such a trend is anticompetitive or results
in higher consumer prices. Indeed, all antitrust challenges under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act to vertical integration of newspapers
have failed,' 59 and the independent distributors provided no pre-
integration competition in any event. Further, true price competi-
tion among independent distributors, which is dictated by the Al-
brecht holding, has never seriously been tried. Given these factors,
preventing vertical integration certainly provides no basis for ex-
empting maximum price fixing from antitrust law's general ban on
vertical and horizontal price fixing. Indeed, perhaps the law's
strong policy against price fixing might alone support Albrecht.
That is, if the newspaper cannot achieve its unique below-cost dis-
tribution goals other than by imposing a price-fixing arrangement
on its independent distributors, then vertical integration is prima
facie preferable.lw
157. To explain why the publisher's distribution goals are not fully shared by in-
dependent dealers, Professor Areeda provided:
The [independent wholesaler's] profits are entirely a function of his wholesale-
retail margin and his volume, while the publisher's profits are a function both of
(1) the wholesale price, publication costs, and volume of newspapers sold, and
(2) advertising revenue, which also depends upon circulation volume. In fact,
newspapers receive the bulk of their revenues from advertising, not from circu-
lation. In many cases, circulation revenue does not even cover the cost of news-
print. Furthermore, advertising revenues are a function of circulation. This
means that a newspaper "monopolist" ordinarily maximizes his profit by in-
creasing his circulation and not by restricting the output of newspapers. This
interest conflicts with that of independent dealers who naturally wish to maxi-
mize their profits based on circulation alone. Thus, the publisher has a greater
incentive than the dealers to assure high quality service to subscribers at lower
rather than higher prices....
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 147, 729.7a (footnotes omitted).
158. Id
159. See id.
160. Albrecht also has been criticized for stifling the use of allegedly legitimate busi-
ness practices that have an indirect or partial effect on the maximum price chareed by
sales quotas, agreements limiting "unfair" practices or requiring "competitive"
prices; dual distribution as a de facto limit on dealer prices; suggested, adver-
tised, or pre-ticketed prices; refusals to continue selling to overcharging dealers;
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V. CONCLUSION
Few antitrust principles have been criticized as roundly or as
often as the rule announced in Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht that
vertical maximum price fixing is illegal per se. In attempting to
establish that "[a]nalysis shows that every vertical restraint should
be completely lawful," '61 Judge Bork and the rest of the Chicago
School reserve perhaps their harshest criticism for Albrecht, the
alleged weakest link in Supreme Court case law proscribing verti-
cal restraints. 6 2 In ARCO, the Court clearly indicated its lack of
enthusiasm for Albrecht, only "grudgingly" '63 assuming "argu-
endo, that Albrecht correctly held that vertical maximum price fix-
ing is subject to the per se rule." 16
In fact, as this Article demonstrates, the criticism is unjustified.
True analysis shows that Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart were cor-
rectly decided and based upon straightforward applications of ba-
sic antitrust principles. The arguments against them, based
primarily upon the "control of successive monopoly" paradigm or
the specter of vertical integration, fail to withstand scrutiny, partic-
ularly when those arguments are applied to the only common verti-
cal maximum price-fixing fact pattern-newspaper distribution. In
sum, despite the voluminous commentary, no convincing argument
has yet been made for departure from a rule of per se illegality for
vertical maximum price fixing.
conditional reimbursements and various formulae relating wholesale to resale
prices; temporary promotional prices; and wholesale price discounts to assist
particular "low-price" resales.
8 AREEDA, supra note 38, T 1639, at 422 (footnote omitted). In fact, Albrecht provides
little impediment to most such arrangements. As Professor Areeda discusses at length,
id. 1639a-h, at 422-38, courts have rejected most maximum price-fixing challenges to
such practices leaving "considerable leeway for such indirect and informal steps" under
Albrecht. Id. 1638c.
161. BORK, PARADOX, supra note 9, at 288.
162. Id. at 281-82.
163. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 1 10 S. Ct. 1884, 1901 n. 16 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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